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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
UINTAH COUNTY,
Plaintiff/Appellant
vs.
JIMMIE N. REIDHEAD, NYLE C.
BIGELOW, GLEN MCKEE, Uintah
County Commissioners, WESTERN
SURETY CO., Bondsman

CASE NO. 900490-CA

Defendants/Appellees
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The Honorable Dennis L. Draney Presiding
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah State Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(j) having been transferred
from the Utah State Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
1.

Are the Defendants as a matter of law entitled to Summary

Judgment on the issue of good faith alone in view of the fact that
part of the relief sought was to enjoin Defendants from maintaining
the road in question when an issue was presented and undecided as
to whether the road is a dedicated road or not?

2.

In view of the evidence presented, showing that the

decision to pave the road was not made in an open meeting, that the
matter was not included in the budget itself; that Commissioner
Reidhead alone derived benefit therefore does this present a
question as to whether the action was taken in good faith?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was filed pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12
by the Uintah County Attorney in behalf of Uintah County against
Defendants, Uintah County Commissioners and their bondsman, praying
for Judgment in the Eighth Judicial District Court for Uintah
County,

State

of Utah,

in the amount

of

$20,000.00

and an

injunction to restrain the Commissioners from further paving a lane
which lead to Commissioner Reidhead's property, alleging the same
was a private road. The matter was heard on April 10, 1990, before
Judge Dennis L^ Draney, and Summary Judgment rendered in favor of
said Defendants from which Judgment Plaintiff Appeals.
STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant text of statutes and rules pertinent to resolving
this case will be cited here and verbatim text included in an
Addendum attached hereto.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Rule

These are as follows:

Code Annotated 17-5-12
Code Annotated 17-5-16(3)
Code Annotated 27-12-89
Code Annotated 27-15-3
Code Annotated 52-4-1 through 7
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arose out of the paving of a lane of Commissioner
Jimmie N. Reidhead by the County on August 24, 1989.

Subsequently,

the Uintah County Attorney, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 17-512, filed an action to recover damages in the Eighth Judicial
District Court in the amount of $20,000.00 and enjoin the County
from maintaining the road, alleging that the same was a private
driveway and not a public road.

The matter was heard on April 10,

1990, on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment was
rendered for Defendants, the Court holding that Defendants acted
in good faith and that it was not necessary to rule on the question
of whether the road was dedicated or not.

Said Judgment being

entered on June 4, 1990, from this Judgment Plaintiff Appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant will argue that the Court was in error in ruling
that the issue be decided on the question of good faith and that
it was not necessary to rule upon the issue as to whether the road
was

dedicated

or

not.

Appellant

will

argue

in

connection

therewith, that inasmuch as Appellant requested an injunction to
restrain the County from maintaining the road and legal issue was
ventured requiring a ruling despite whether said Defendants might
claim

immunity

exception.

from

monetary

damages

under

the

good

faith

Appellant asserts that the record will show disputed

facts on this issue that preclude the awarding of Summary Judgment.

3

The Defendants will further argue that in view of the fact
that the decision to pave the road was not made in a regular public
meeting

of the Commission, at a meeting

that

was not held in

compliance of the open meeting law, that the same was not regularly
budgeted in the County Budget, that Commissioner Reidhead benefited
therefrom and an issue is raised as to the good faith performance
of the Commission in paving the road.
ARGUMENT
Before responding specifically to precise points of issue,
Appellant calls attention to the following general principle that
will apply to both points of the Argument ventured respecting a
Summary

Judgment, and in regard thereto it will

be noted that

pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that
the same will lie:
f,

[I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers,
interrogatories, and admissions
on file,
together with affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."
Further it has been established by the Court that in rendering
such a Judgment the Court is not to determine the weight of the
evidence

or

the

credibility

of

the

witnesses

(Singleton

v.

Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 291, 431 P2d 126, Sandburg v. Klien, 576 P2d
1201), nor is it to determine what the facts are, but only whether
there is a material

issue of fact (Hill ex rel Fogel v. Grand

Central , Inc. . 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P2d 150), and any issue of doubt
4

is to be resolved in favor of the opposing party (Bowen v. Riverton
City, 656 P2d 434), having prefaced the Argument, Appellant will
proceed to discuss his respective points of issue.
POINT I
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN RULING THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT COULD BE
RENDERED TO DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THERE WAS NO
SHOWING THAT THEY ACTED IN BAD FAITH AND THE COURT NEED NOT
CONSIDER THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE ROAD WAS A DEDICATED ROAD OR
NOT.
In noting the Court's ruling it held that the only question
that need be decided is whether Defendants, as public officers,
acted in "good faith" and it need not consider the question of
whether the road in question is dedicated or not (Court's Ruling
Page 2 ) .

This disregards the fact that Appellant (Plaintiff) in

its complaint requested that Defendant Commissioners be enjoined
"from further expenditure on said road for either construction or
maintenance

of

the

same"

(Prayer

of

Plaintiff's

Complaint).

Furthermore this prayer is in keeping with the portion of the law
under which the said action was filed which provides that:
"Whenever any Board of County Commissioners
without authority of law order any money paid
for any purpose and such money shall have been
actually paid, or whenever any other county
officer has drawn any warrant in his own favor
for any other person without being authorized
thereto, by the Board of County Commissioners
or by law and the same shall have been paid,
the County Attorney of such County upon
receiving notice shall commence suit in the
name of the County to restrain payment of the
same.
No order of the Board of County
Commissioners is necessary in order to maintain
such action." [italics added]
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Noting this section implicit under the same action is the duty
of the County Attorney not only to recover monetary damages, but
to

restrain

further

expenditure

and

in

ruling

solely

on the

question of monetary relief, the Court left unanswered, and at
issue the question as to whether the expenditure was made on a
public

road

or

private driveway

and

thus

a

legitimate

public

expenditure of public monies.
Noting the Courtfs decisions with respect to the law on this
matter the cases (Snvder v Merkley, 693 P2d 64, Salt Lake County
v Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P 1075) are precedent merely as to the
question of monetary liability, and certainly do not hold on the
question as to injunctive relief.
Like the record very definitely shows issues of material fact
raised on the question as to whether the road is a dedicated public
road, the Affidavits of George Houston and Homer Lee contradict the
testimony (of Nyle Bigelow and Jimmie N. Reidhead if hearsay) in
the depositions.

Plaintiff/Appel lant has taken issue and cited

precedent as to the "adopted "B" road" map (Thompson v Condas, 27
Utah 2d 129, 493 P2d 639), also as to the adopting map (Plaintiff's
Memorandum) Bonner v Sandburg, 18 Utah 2d 140).

Similarly in the

case of Peterson v Combo, 20 U2d 376, 438 P2d 545, the Court held
that more than mere resolution was required to make a road a public
road and in connection therewith 23 AmJur 2d, Dedication, Section
24(P27):

6

"The mere exhibition of a plat or map showing
the location of areas proposed for public use
does not constitute a dedication. Ordinarily
there must be in addition an acceptance by the
public to make the dedication complete."
Noting this fact, a mere acceptance of a map of several roads
approved for "B" road funding does not amount to such a dedication
and while the same does not apply to "B" roads, by implication the
statement of the law on Class "D" roads by inference and analogy
indicates department policy toward such funding when it is noted:
"This department shall scribe each road shown
on this map on its own County map series but
shall not be responsible for the validity of
any such road nor it being inventoried."
Similarly, the Memorandum raises the issue and cites precedent
to show that a road used as a private easement cannot acquire
dedication for such use (Gilmor v Carter. 15 Utah 2d 280).
By issue, noting the fact that the road was used for the
benefit

of

Commissioner

Reidhead

the circumstances

raises the

question of whether Equitable Estoppel might raise an issue as to
whether it be ruled a dedicated road.

All of which present issues

of material fact that preclude Summary Judgment.
POINT II
THE RECORD PRESENTS ISSUES OVER MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER THE
COMMISSIONERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN RULING TO PAVE THE ROAD.
It is conceded that as to monetary damages that unless there
is shown by the pleading

that the Commissioners

acted in good

faith, there can be no monetary damages incurred by the Defendants.
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In making such a ruling and concluding that the evidence showed
nothing

to

indicate

they

acted

otherwise,

the Court

no doubt

misconstrued the rule in Salt Lake v. Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P
1075 and Snyder v Merkley, 693 P2d 64, for in both of those cases,
the individual litigants derived no personal increment or gain from
the Commissioners action, while in the instant case Commissioner
Reidhead and he alone benefited from the action in paving the road.
Similarly, the depositions of both Commissioner McKee and Bigelow
were aware of this fact (Nyle C. Bigelow Deposition Page 8 & 9).
Similarly, while this is a discretionary function and in the
absence of the showing of fraud or bad faith liability does not lie
for unauthorized expenditure of public monies.

There are facts

from the pleading that show genuine issues of good faith first; the
record
regular

of depositions show that the action was not
County

Commissioner's

Meeting

but

at

a

taken at a

road

meeting

(Deposition Nyle C. Bigelow Page 8 and Deposition Glen C. McKee
Page 4 ) . Despite the testimony as to the manner in which the road
meetings were held the Agenda of said road meeting and the minutes
thereto, verified by Gary McClellan, show the open meetings law was
not complied with in deciding to pave this road (Copy of minutes
Agenda Road Meeting August 8, 1989 Addendum, Exhibit " A " ) , there
is no showing on the Agenda that the paving of the road was to be
considered,

no record

of vote thereon, and notation

of people

present, and while the matter of open meetings does not enter into
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this discussion directly, it has been raised in the depositions and
raises an issue of a lack of good faith that
Summary Judgment.

should preclude

Similarly, it is noted that no notation is made

of the road in the Department Budge (see budget attached) that the
Department "willy-nilly" used the budget to fit projects in and
that no road book has been kept for such expenditures as required
by law (Utah Code Annotated 17-5-16(3)); that the extension of the
lane was made a part of paving the Mitchell Road (see projects "B"
road

funds

estimates

- Paul

Feltch's Deposition

of the cost

Page

28).

Also as to

(cost estimate Addendum Exhibit

"B" and

Exhibit "C") documents certified by Paul Feltch.
Noting all of these matters, that the same were only produced
shortly before the hearing, each of them raise material issues as
to whether the action of paving the road was ventured in good
faith.

Similarly, conceding that the action was undertaken as a

discretionary function, the Court has said that even in performing
a discretionary function, that "discretion does not mean absolute
or arbitrary

power."

The

discretion must

be

exercised

in a

reasonable manner, and not maliciously, wantonly, and arbitrarily
to the wrong and injury of another (Murphy v Grand County, 1 Utah
2d 412, 68 P2d 677 at 426 8 P2d 677).

Surely where the facts of

record show that paving of the road in question was decided on at
a road meeting not noticed out, for the benefit

of one of the

Commissioners, not budgeted, with no minutes of record of a record
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vote, not placed on the Agenda at a meeting of the Commissioners
Office indicate an arbitrary decision on the part of the Commission
in outrageously exercising a discretionary function; and raises
therewith a question of good faith performance.
Similarly,

there

is

precedent

from

cases

outside

the

Jurisdiction on the good faith rule will support the question that
the Commission in the instant situation breached the good faith
rule, particularly a North Carolina Court addressed the issue in
the light of the good faith immunity where the Mayor was sued for
funds spent on contracts not publicly bid, and in the face of a
jury

verdict

that

found

the Mayor

"unlawfully,

willfully

and

knowingly let"..."(the contract) with the intent to evade the law
with regard to advertisement and letting of municipal

contracts

Despite the Mayor's claim that he owed no public liability
because "he did not act corruptly or with malice" the Court in this
instance held that because Plaintiffs were not seeking recovery as
individuals but acting "in behalf" of the city the case stands on
a different principle, to-wit:
"Where public funds are wrongfully, willfully,
and knowingly disbursed by municipal officers
without adequate consideration moving to the
municipality and with intent to evade the
law...those responsible.. .may be required to
make good the loss to the public treasury."
(Moore v Lambeth, 207 N.C. 23, 175 S.E. 714)
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While

this precedent

has not been frequently

followed by

analogy it might be applied to the present situation where a road
that accrues to the benefit of a Commissioner alone is paved at
public expense on a road that leads solely to his property, said
action taken outside a public meeting, without notice or agenda,
or minutes that indicate who were present certainly the action
appears

evasive of the law, nd there are material

should preclude awarding Summary Judgment.

issues that

In this instance the

evasion relates not to awarding a contract, but paving a road to
the increment of one of the parties.

If it be shown that such

action were deliberate, then the shield to good

faith will be

removed.
Similarly, there are precedents that indicate "that shields
public

officials

from

civil

liability

where

conduct

does not

violate rights which1' a reasonable person would have known (Harlow
v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800).
The

doctrine

removes

the

"shield"

when

the

official

"knowingly" violates a statutory standard and while this doctrine
has been applied only to "monetary damages" in civil rights actions
(Sampson v King, 693 F2d 566, Green v White, 693 F2d 45) by analogy
if the material issues raised in the pleadings could be established
in the trial, a question as to whether the Commissioners did act
in good faith could be raised, and from the facts alluded to in the
pleadings the Plaintiff ought not to be precluded that opportunity.

11

CONCLUSION
Appellant argues in conclusion that Summary Judgment is only
to be awarded in cases where from the pleadings when viewed in the
most

favorable light there is no material

issue of fact to be

resolved and the prevailing party is entitled to a judgement as a
matter of law.
material tact,

From the argument set forth there are issues of
whether the road in question was a dedicated road,

and whether the Commission be enjoined from maintaining the same,
presenting therewith an issue of a material fact relevant to the
relief sought and therefore on that precludes Summary Judgment.
Similarly, as noted herein considering that the paving of the
road accrued to the benefit of Commissioner Reidhead alone that
action was taken on the same otherwise than at a regular County
Commission Meeting, of which the minutes disclose that no agenda
was

published,

no

record

of vote taken, no

record

of parties

present, and with no budget authorization of the road, there are
evidences

sufficient

to

raise

a

question

of

whether

the

Commissioners acted in good faith hence, the action of the Court
in awarding Summary Judgment should be overruled.
DATED this j£

day of October, 1990.

12

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to Lynn
J. Lund, Attorney for Defendants/Appellees, 230 South 500 East
#210, Salt Lake City, Utah
DATED this

-/

84102.

day of October, 1990.

13

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

17-5-12

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 502; C.L.
1917, § 1378; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-9.

17-5-10, 17-5-11. Repealed.
Repeals. Sections 17-5-10 and 17-5-11 (R.S.
1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 503, 504; C.L. 1917,
§§ 1379, 1380; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5.10,
19-5-11), relating to personal interests of mem-

bers of the board of county commissioners in
county contracts, franchises or licenses, were
repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 128, § 15. For
present provisions, see § 67-16-1 et seq.

17-5-12. Moneys unlawfully paid — Recovery — Restraining payment.
Whenever any board of county commissioners shall without authority of
law order any money paid for any purpose and such money shall have been
actually paid, or whenever any other county officer has drawn any warrant in
his own favor or in favor of any other person without being authorized thereto
by the board of county commissioners or by law and the same shall have been
paid, the county attorney of such county shall institute suit in the name of the
county against such person or such officer and his official bondsman to recover
the money so paid, and when the money has not been paid on such order or
warrants, the county attorney of such county upon receiving notice thereof
shall commence suit in the name of the county to restrain the payment of the
same; no order of the board of county commissioners shall be necessary in
order to maintain either of such actions.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, $ 506; C.L.
1917, § 1382; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-12.

Cross-References. — Uniform fiscal procedures for counties, § 17-36-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Personal liability of commissioners.
Procedure for bringing action.
Personal liability of commissioners.
County commissioners could not be held personally liable, in absence of fraud or corruption, for unauthorized allowance of claim for
publication of a list of delinquent taxes without
having first invited bids for publication since
the hearing and determination by commissioners of justness or validity of claim in the
question required exercise of judicial, or, at
least, quasi-judicial functions of board. Salt

Lake County v. Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P.
1075 (1911).
Procedure for bringing action.
In an action under this section to recover unlawfully paid money, the county attorney of
the county wherein it was alleged that the
funds were illegally expended must be a party
to bring action, and action must be in the name
of the county. Snyder v. Cook (Utah 1984) 688
P.2d 496.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties § 98.
Key Numbers. — Counties *= 59.
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COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

17-5-16

(8) Authenticate with his signature and the seal of the county clerk the
proceedings of the board whenever the same shall be ordered published.
(9) Authenticate with his signature and the seal of the county clerk all
ordinances or laws passed by the board, and record the same at length in
the ordinance book.
(10) Record all orders levying taxes.
(11) Perform all other duties requried by law or by any rule or order of
the board.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 609; C.L.
1917, § 1385; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-15.

Cross-References. — Duties of county clerk
generally, § 17-20-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Record of proceedings.
Under this section, an order of the board of
equalization directing abatement of assessment under § 59-7-1 et seq. is not void on its

face although the county clerk made record of
board'6 proceedings instead of the county auditor. Board of Educ. v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576,
280 P. 1065 (1929).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties § 141.
Key Numbers. — Counties *=> 89.

17-5-16. Books to be kept
The board must cause to be kept:
(1) A minute book, in which must be recorded all orders and decisions
made by the board and the daily proceedings had at all regular and
special meetings.
(2) An allowance book, in which must be recorded all orders for the
allowance of money from the county treasury, to whom made and on what
account, dating, numbering and indexing the same through each year.
(3) A road book, containing all proceedings and adjudications relating
to the establishment, maintenance, charge and discontinuance of roads
and road districts, and all contracts and other matters pertaining thereto.
(4) A franchise book, containing all franchises granted by the board, for
what purpose, the length of time, and to whom granted, the amount of
bond and license tax required or other consideration to be paid.
(5) An ordinance book, in which must be entered all ordinances or laws
duly passed by the board.
(6) A warrant book, to be kept by the county auditor, in which must be
entered in the order of drawing all warrants drawn on the treasurer, with
their number and reference to the order on the minute book, with date,
amount, on what account and the name of the payee.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 510, books showing recepits and disbursements,
1135; C.L. 1917, §§ 1386,2821; R.S. 1933 & C. § 17-19-6.
1943, 19-5-16.
Enactment
of ordinances
generally,
Cross-References. — Auditor to maintain § 17-15-1.

269

HIGHWAY CODE

2742-89

(3) The State Road Commission may furnish and install lighting systems for such highways, but their operation and maintenance shall be the
responsibility of the city or town.
(4) If new storm sewer facilities are necessary in the construction and
maintenance of such highways, the cost of such facilities shall be borne by
the state and the city or town in such proportion as may be mutually
agreed upon between the State Road Commission and the highway authorities of the city or town.
(5) The State Road Commission is authorized to regulate the location
and construction of approach roads and driveways entering upon any such
highway, but the commission may delegate the administration of such
regulations to the highway authorities of the city or town.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 88.
Compiler's Notes. — The State Road Commission was abolished and its assets and liabil-

ities were transferred to the Department of
Transportation by Laws 1975, ch 204, §§ 17
and 18. See §§ 63-49-13 and 63-49-14.

ARTICLE 6
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR HIGHWAY
PURPOSES
27-12-89. Public use constituting dedication.
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare
for a period of ten years.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 89.
Cross-References. — Dedication by plat,
§ 57-5-4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Burden of proof.
Change in highway.
Control by landowners.
Estoppel
Intent of landowner.
—Necessary.
-Not necessary.
Tubhc" defined.
Rights granted to public
Rights of subsequent grantees.
Sufficiency of proof of dedication
Thoroughfare" and "public thoroughfare" distinguished
**tle not passed.
Burden of proof.
^phere claim is made that a highway has
Dee
n dedicated to public use, there is a pre•J^ption in favor of the property owner and
«* burden of establishing public use for the

required period of time is on those claiming it.
Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow
Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981).
Change in highway v
A public highway over public lands is established, although there has been no official acceptance, where it has been used for longer
than ten years, if travel has remained substantially unchanged, and practical identity of road
preserved, that is sufficient, although there
may have been slight deviations from the common way Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v.
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 (1929).
Slight change in course of highway or of its
location that does not materially change or affect the general course thereof or affect its location, nor break or change the continuity of
travel or use, does not constitute abandonment
or affect public nature of highway. Sullivan v.
Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954 (1930).
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Control by landowners.
No dedication was shown under identically
worded predecessor section where it appeared
that an alleyway which had more or less been
used by the public at will for a number of years
had from time to time been closed by the abutting owners, who had at all times exercised
control over it. Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27
Utah 252, 75 P. 620 (1904).
Estoppel.
Municipality may be estopped from asserting
dedication by acts and conduct that have been
relied on by others to their prejudice and, likewise, private individual may be estopped in the
same way where he stands by and permits
others to improve land claimed to have been
dedicated. Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112
Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947).
Intent of landowner.
—Necessary.
In order for a private road to become a public
thoroughfare there must be evidence of intent
by the owner to dedicate the road to a public
use and an acceptance by the public. Such intent may be inferred from declarations, acts or
circumstances and use by the general public.
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d
426 (1964) (but see cases noted under "—Not
necessary" below).
For cases discussing landowner's intent to
dedicate road to public use, see Wilson v. Hull,
7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799 (1890); Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898); Schettler
v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955 (1901);
Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252, 75 P.
620 (1904); Brown v. Oregon Short Line R.R.,
36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740 (1909); Morris v.
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916); William J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc.,
51 Utah 178, 169 P. 459 (1917); Barboglio v.
Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385 (1923).
—Not necessary.
The determination that a roadway has been
continuously used by members of the general
public for at least ten years is the sole requirement for it to become a public road; it is not
necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer
the road to the public. Thurman v. Byram, 626
P.2d 447 (Utah 1981).
To establish a dedication of a road to a public
use, it is not necessary to prove landowner's
intent to dedicate the road to a public use. Leo
M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches,
639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981).
"Public" defined.
Owners of property abutting or straddling
rural road and their personal visitors were not
members of public generally within this provision; burden of proving real public use of that
road continuously for ten years was not met in

suit
that
fare.
P.2d

by subdividers who sought to establish
the road had become a public thoroughPetersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438
545 (1968).

Rights granted to public.
City still owned fee to strip, acquired under
Townsite Act (43 U.S.C. § 718 et seq.), after
alleged dedication thereof as public street, so
that only right that public could have acquired
would be right to easement across strip for
traveling purposes, and only additional right
contiguous property owners might acquire
would be right of ingress to and egress from
their property. Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City,
112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947).
Rights of subsequent grantees.
Where land is dedicated by owner as highway and is accepted by public as such, all subsequent grantees of abutting lands are bound
by dedication. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305,
64 P. 955 (1901).
Sufficiency of proof of dedication.
Highway over privately owned ground will
be deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public use when the public has continuously used
it as a thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127
(1916).
Mere use by public of private alley in common with owners of alley does not show a dedication thereof to public use, or vest any right in
public to the way. Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah
2d 340, 273 P.2d 720 (1954).
Though dedication of one's land to public use
should not be lightly regarded, where a narrow, private dead-end street was used by
neighboring residents and the general public
without interference for at least 25 years, and
where the city had platted it as a public street
in 1915 and had thereafter paved it and maintained a public street sign at its entrance, and
where plaintiff who owned the fee simple interest in the land on which the street was situated
had not paid any taxes on the street property
for 25 years, this combination of factors was
sufficient to justify finding that the street had
been dedicated to public use. Bonner v.
Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646 (1966).
Clear and convincing quantum and quality
of proof is required for the establishment of a
public thoroughfare or taking of another'*
property. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129.
493 P.2d 639 (1972).
Where the trial court found that public baaused north-south road for 12 years and thai
during this time, the road was ten feet wide,
and the court found that there was insufficient
use of an east-west road by the public to ma**
it a public road, these findings of fact supported bv substantial evidence, c o m P e l , e ? 1 i r
holding that the north-south road was a puwic
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highway ten feet wide and that no public highway existed on the east-west road Western
Kane County Special Serv Dist No 1 v Jackson Cattle Co, 744 P 2d 1376 (Utah 1987)
For cases finding sufficient evidence to sup
port finding of dedication to public use, 6ee Sul
hvan v Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P 954
(1930), Jeremy v Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116
P 2d 420 (1941), Boyer v Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395,
326 P 2d 107 (1958), Clark v Erekson, 9 Utah
2d 212, 341 P2d 424 (1959)

27-12-90

tion, a "thoroughfare" was a place or way
through which there is passing or travel It became a "public thoroughfare" when the public
acquired a general right of passage Moms v
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P 1127 (1916)
Title not passed.
Where owner of land deeded it to city for
public use but city never accepted it, no dedication took place and claim of purchaser from
city was invalid as against subsequent purchaser from original owner of land William J
Lemp Brewing Co v P J Moran, Inc , 51 Utah
176, 169 P 459 (1917)

"Thoroughfare" and "public thoroughfare" distinguished.
Under identically worded predecessor see-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 39A C J S Highways § 15
Key Numbers. — Highways «= 6(1)

Am Jur. 2d — 39 Am Jur 2d Highways,
Streets, and Bridges § 25 et seq

27-12-90. Highways once established continue until abandoned.
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction
over any such highway, or by other competent authority.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, & 90.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
part of road and could not be abandoned except
as provided by statute Adney v State Rd
Comm'n, 67 Utah 567, 248 P 811 (1926)

ANALYSIS

Abutting owners' rights
Bndges
Notice of abandonment required
Platted but unused streets
Power of city to abandon
Requisites for abandonment

Notice of abandonment required
County commissioners may not order abandonment of a county road unless notice thereof
is given according to § 27-12-102 4 Ercanbmck v Judd, 524 P 2d 595 (Utah 1974)

Abutting owners' rights
While public may abandon street or highway
insofar as it affects rights of public therein,
such abandonment, however, will not affect
rights of abutting owner with respect to use of
easement for mgTess and egress to and from
his premises Hague v Juab County Mill &
Elevator Co , 37 Utah 290, 107 P 249 (1910)
Where property is sold with reference to a
map or plat showing it to abut on a public
highway, this constitutes an implied covenant
that high* ay will not be obstructed or interfered with by grantor While highway by abandonment may pass out of jurisdiction of local
authorities, rights of abutting owners will not
°e affected Tuttle v Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501,
12
$ P 959 (1912)
^ndges.
Bndge owned by county was an essential

Platted but unused streets.
Corporation was able to give good title to
land platted for streets and alleyway6 but
never used as such, since under proviso in former law, road not used or worked for five years
ceased to be a highway Mallory v Taggart, 24
Utah 2d 267, 470 P 2d 254 (1970)
Power of city to abandon.
City, as dedicator of strip acquired under
Townsite Act (43 U S C § 718 et seq ) as public street, could vacate or revoke dedication
even without enactment of ordinance, unless
dedication was accepted by public use, subject
to rights acquired by reliance on dedication
Premium Oil Co v Cedar City, 112 Utah 324,
187 P 2d 199 (1947)
Requisites for abandonment
Where a high^av is dedicated as a public
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27-15-2. Designation of class D roads.
(1) Each road is designated as part of the highway and road system within
the state of Utah with the same force and effect as if the road had been
included within this system upon its being first established or constructed.
(2) Each road shall also be known as class D road.
History: C. 1953, 27-15-2, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 9, § 2.

27-15-3. Maps to be prepared by county — Indication of
roads.
(1) Each county shall prepare maps showing to the best of its ability the
roads within its boundaries which were in existence as of October 21, 1976.
Preparation of these maps may be done by the county itself or through any
multi-county planning district in which the county participates. A county
shall be given a minimum of two years to complete mapping of the roads
within its boundaries.
(2) Any road which is established or constructed after October 21, 1976,
shall similarly be reflected on maps prepared as provided in Subsection (1).
(3) Upon completion of any map provided for under either Subsection (1) or
Subsection (2) the county shall provide a copy of it to the Department of
Transportation. This department shall scribe each road shown on this map on
its own county map series but shall not be responsible for the validity of any
such road nor for its being inventoried. The department shall also keep on file
an historical map record of the roads as so provided by the counties.
History: C. 1953, 27-15-3, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 9, § 3; 1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 1.

Cross-References. — Plats of highways
and roads maintained by counties, § 27-12-26.

399

OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS

52-4-1

52-3-2. Each day of violation a separate offense.
Each day any such person, father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter,
sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousins, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law, is
retained in office by any of said officials shall be regarded as a separate
offense
History: L. 1931, ch. 13, § 2; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 49-12-2.

52-3-3. Penalty.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
History: L. 1931, ch. 13, § 3; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 49-12-3; L. 1953, ch. 79, § 2.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3 201, 76-3 204, 76-3-301

52-3-4. Exception in towns.
In towns, this chapter shall not apply to the employment of uncles, aunts,
nephews, nieces or cousins.
History: L. 1931, ch. 13, § 4; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 49-12-4.

CHAPTER 4
OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS
Section
52-4-1
52-4-2
52-4-3
52-4-4
52-4-5

Section
Declaration of public policy
Definitions
Meetings open to the public — Exceptions
Closed meeting held upon vote of
members — Business — Reasons
for meeting recorded
Purposes of closed meetings —
Chance meetings and social meet-

52-4-6
52-4-7
52-4-8
52-4-9

ings excluded — Disruption of
meetings
Public notice of meetings
Minutes of open meetings — Public
records — Recording of meetings
Suit to void final action — Limitation — Exceptions
Enforcement of chapter — Suit to
compel compliance

52-4-1. Declaration of public policy.
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the state,
its agencies and political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and
that their deliberations be conducted openly.
History: L. 1955, ch. 133, § 1; 1977, ch.

*7r § l-

erences
nan!?8
* r 9 e m e U j r y mainte"
*£<* commissioners, board meetings public,

County commissioners, board meetings pub-

he, § 17-5-8
County

improvement district board of
§ 17-6-3 4

t r u s t e e s m e e tings,
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Judicial Council meetings, Rules of Judicial
Administration, Rule 2-103.
Liquor control commission meetings to be
open, § 32A-1-6C6).
Municipal governing bodies, meetings subject to this chapter, § 10-3-601.

State money management council meetings,
§ 51-7-16.
State board of financial institutions subject
to this chapter, § 7-1-203(3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Deliberations.

ADDUcabilitv
Deliberations.

Public Service Commission's deliberations
l
^ °P en t° t n e public when
they are part of the "decision making" or judicial phase of the commission's work. Common
^
Q
rf
Utah
Utah ^
Comm>
„ 0 , 1 Q 1 Q ,1Q7Qx
VM
161Z
(iy/y)
*

a r e n o t r e c u i r e d to

m ? . a ? Iy' •
±
i- ii . .i TT. i
Th.s chapter is not applicable to the Utah
State Retirement Board. Ellis v. Utah State
Retirement Bd., 757 P.2d 882 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Common Cause v.
Utah Public Service Commission — The Appli-

cability of Open-Meeting Legislation to QuasiJudicial Bodies, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 829.

52-4-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body, with a quorum
present, whether in person or by means of electronic equipment, for the
purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the public body
has jurisdiction or advisory power. This chapter shall not apply to chance
meetings. "Convening," as used in this subsection, means the calling of a
meeting of a public body by a person or persons authorized to do so for the
express purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which that
public body has jurisdiction.
(2) "Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or
legislative body of the state or its political subdivisions which consists of
two or more persons that expends, disburses, or is supported in whole or
in part by tax revenue and which is vested with the authority to make
decisions regarding the public's business. "Public body" does not include
any political party, group, or caucus nor any conference committee, rules
or sifting committee of the Legislature.
(3) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership of a public
body, unless otherwise defined by applicable law, but a quorum does not
include a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no action,
either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which these elected
officials have jurisdiction.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-2, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 180, § 2; 1981, ch. 191, § 1; 1987,
ch. 86, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective March 16, 1987, substituted
"chapter" for "act" in the introductory Ian-

guage; substituted "in person" for "corporal in
Subsection (1); and in the second sentence of
Subsection (2) substituted "nor any wnferencr
committee, rules or sifting committee" for or
rules or sifting committees."
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52-4-3. Meetings open to the public — Exceptions.
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed pursuant to Sections
52-4-4 and 52-4-5.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-3, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 180, § 3.

Cross-References. — Violations, suit to
void final action, § 52-4-8

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Public Service Commission.
Public Service Commission meetings should
be open to public during commission's "mformation obtaining" phase, but not during "decision making" or judicial phase, any final and
formal action on ordinances, resolutions, rules,

regulations, contracts, or appointments should
be announced or issued in a meeting open to
the public Common Cause of Utah v Utah
Pub Serv Comm'n, 598 P2d 1312 (Utah
1979)

52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of members — Business — Reasons for meeting recorded.
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
members of the public body present at an open meeting for which notice is
given pursuant to Section 52-4-6; provided, a quorum is present. No closed
meeting is allowed except as to matters exempted under Section 52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment
shall be approved at a closed meeting The reason or reasons for holding a
closed meeting and the vote, either for or against the proposition to hold such
a meeting, cast by each member by name shall be entered on the minutes of
the meeting
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any meeting to be
closed to the public
History: C. 1953, 52-4-4, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 180, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Public Service Commission.
Public Service Commission meetings should
be open to public during commission's "mformation obtaining' phase, but not during "decision making" or judicial phase, any final and
formal action on ordinances, resolutions, rules,

regulations, contracts, or appointments should
be announced or issued in a meeting open to
the public Common Cause of Utah v Utah
p u b Serv Comm'n, 598 P 2d 1312 (Utah
1979)

52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings — Chance meetings
and social meetings excluded — Disruption of
meetings.
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section 52-4-4 for any of the
following purposes(a) discussion of the character, professional competence, or physical or
mental health of an individual,
(b) strategy sessions with respect to collective bargaining, litigation, or
purchase of real property,
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(c) discussion regarding deployment of security personnel or devices;
and
(d) investigative proceedings regarding allegations of criminal misconduct.
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance meeting or a social meeting.
No chance meeting or social meeting shall be used to circumvent this chapter.
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of any person who willfully
disrupts a meeting to the extent that orderly conduct is seriously compromised.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-5, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 180, § 5.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
exemptions, under 5 USCS § 552b(c), to open

meeting requirement of Sunshine Act, 82
A.L.R. Fed. 465.

52-4-6. Public notice of meetings.
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that are scheduled in
advance over the course of a year shall give public notice at least once each
year of its annual meeting schedule as provided in this section. The public
notice shall specify the date, time, and place of such meetings.
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section,
each public body shall give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the agenda,
date, time and place of each of its meetings.
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by:
(a) posting written notice at the principal office of the public body, or if
no such office exists, at the building where the meeting is to be held; and
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of general circulation
within the geographic jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media
correspondent.
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is necessary for a public
body to hold an emergency meeting to consider matters of an emergency or
urgent nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2) may be disregarded and the best notice practicable given. No such emergency meeting of a
public body shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify all of its
members and a majority votes in the affirmative to hold the meeting.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-6, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 180, § 6; 1978, ch. 17, § 1.

Cross-References. — Closed meeting held
upon vote at open meeting, § 52-4-4.
Violations, suit to void final action, § 52-4-8

52-4-7. Minutes of open meetings — Public records — Recording of meetings.
(1) Written minutes shall be kept of all open meetings. Such minutes shall
include:
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting;
(b) the names of members present and absent;
224

OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS

52-4-9

(c) the substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or decided, and a
record, by individual member, of votes taken;
(d) the names of all citizens who appeared and the substance in brief of
their testimony;
(e) any other information that any member requests be entered in the
minutes.
(2) Written minutes shall be kept of all closed meetings. Such minutes shall
include:
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting;
(b) the names of members present and absent;
(c) the names of all others present except where such disclosure would
infringe on the confidence necessary to fulfill the original purpose of
closing the meeting.
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be available within a reasonable time after the meeting.
(4) All or any part of an open meeting may be recorded by any person in
attendance; provided, the recording does not interfere with the conduct of the
meeting.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-7, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 180, § 7; 1978, ch. 17, § 2.

52-4-8. Suit to void final action — Limitation — Exceptions.
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 and 52-4-6 is voidable
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be commenced within 90 days after the action except that with respect to any final
action concerning the issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days after the action.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-8, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 180, § 8; 1978, ch. 17, § 3.

52-4-9. Enforcement of chapter — Suit to compel compliance.
(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of the state shall enforce this
chapter.
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may commence suit in a
court of competent jurisdiction to compel compliance with or enjoin violations
of this chapter or to determine its applicability to discussions or decisions of a
public body. The court may award reasonable attorney fees and court costs to
a successful plaintifT.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-9, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 180, § 9.
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, fc 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8.
Amendment Notes — The 1988 amendmentb) Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a)
and (b) in Subsection (1), inserted "resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a), substituted "state agencies" for
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a),
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2 )(a),
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision
of law" at the end of Subsection (2)(a), inserted
Subsection (b), redesignated former Subsections (2)(b^ to (2Kh) as Subsections (2uc> to
(2)0), added "except those from the small
claims department of a circuit court' at the end

of Subsection (2)(d), and made minor stylistic
changes
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection
(2)(h) as Subsection (2HD
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(2)(a), rewrote the phrase before "except"
which had read "the final orders and decrees of
state and local agencies or appeals from the
district court review of them", deleted "notwithstanding any other provision of law " at the
end of Subsection (2)(a), inserted present Subsection (2Kb), designated former Subsections
(2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i), and
substituted "first degree or capital felon}" for
"fir^t or capital degree felony" in present Subsection (2uf)
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